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Abstract
Space systems are a critical enabler of the net-centric operation warfare (NCOW)
needed to achieve victory in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The effective
acquisition of affordable systems is vital to our National Security Strategy.

Space

systems play an important role throughout a wide spectrum of military and civil
operations. Several challenging factors unique to space systems development are the
high level of technological complexity, a broad joint user base, and the reliance on
seamless interoperable systems to achieve superior capabilities for US warfighters. This
research examines the interaction between the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) and the National Security Space Acquisition Process
(NSSAP) through a qualitative case study and identifies ways to improve this interaction
by answering investigative questions and providing recommendations to be tested in
future research.
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REVIEW OF THE JOINT CAPABILITY INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT
SYSTEM (JCIDS) AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACQUISITION
PROCESS (NSSAP)

I. Introduction
1.1 Space System Criticality
Space systems are a critical enabler of the net-centric operation warfare (NCOW)
needed to achieve victory in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). A joint mix of
ground, airborne, and space systems are required. Joint airborne and space assets are
required to achieve persistent, global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
coverage. Joint ground, airborne, and space assets are required to implement the Global
Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) and are required for earth and space
environment awareness. Space is the only alternative for global position, navigation, and
timing (PNT) coverage. The affordable and timely acquisition of space systems is vital
to a net-centric National Security Strategy.
Some claim that the process for acquiring effective military space systems (and
military acquisitions at large) is broken, while others claim that the process works
because US systems are still superior to those of other nations. DoD’s concept of
maintaining superiority through constant transformation makes this argument moot by
recognizing that opportunities for improvement must be seized when presented.
Aside from the important role that space systems play across the spectrum of
military and civil operations, space system acquisition must be continually reviewed and
maintain a state of transformation to overcome several factors unique to space system
acquisition.
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1.2 Background
The Department of Defense (DoD) decision support systems guide the process of
identifying the need for, acquiring, and financing materiel solutions when appropriate.
These systems include the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System
(JCIDS), the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) or National Security Space Acquisition
Process (NSSAP) for space systems, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution (PPBE) Process.
Typically, DoD efforts to improve the overall process of acquiring a system have
focused on only one of the decision support systems at a time, although the problems
with the entire process may be attributed to how the decision support systems interact,
rather than the internal structure of a single decision support system. The most recent
wave of reform measures affected the JCIDS and DAS. In May 2003, DoD reissued the
DoD 5000 series, including the DoD Directive 5000.1, DoD Instruction 5000.2, and DoD
Defense Acquisition Guidebook with the major change being that evolutionary
acquisition was identified as the preferred strategy for managing an acquisition program.
In June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 3170 series was reissued,
replacing the Requirements Generation System (RGS) with the Joint Capability
Integration and Development System (JCIDS).

The latest reform measure was the

creation of the NSSAP and its guiding documentation, the National Security Space
Acquisition Policy 03-01 (NSSAP 03-01), directing acquisition policy specifically for
space systems.

2

1.3 Overview
This thesis looks at the interaction between the JCIDS and the NSSAP and
identifies ways to improve these processes. The remainder of this chapter will present
the problem the thesis attempts to address and provide a brief description of the scope,
methodology, limitations, and significance of this research. Chapter Two will provide a
literature review of current acquisition research, literature, and process documentation
focusing on those items directly related to the JCIDS and NSSAP. Chapter Three will
describe the methodology for theory building from the qualitative case study. The case
study will be based on available literature, documentation, and interviews conducted in
this research. The results and recommendations will be presented and discussed in
Chapter Four. Conclusions and future research recommendations will be presented in
Chapter Five.
1.4 Problem
This thesis attempts to answer the question: what changes need to be made to
enable more effective interaction between the National Security Space Acquisition
Process (NSSAP) and the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS)
to field affordable space systems?
Ten investigative questions will be answered through the literature review and
interviews to aid in developing recommendations to the above problem. Those questions
include:
•
•
•
•
•

What are the goals of an EA strategy?
What is an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy?
How is an EA strategy implemented?
What development processes are alternatives to evolutionary acquisitions?
What are capability-based acquisitions?
3

•
•
•

What are the goals of a capability-based strategy?
How are capability-based acquisitions implemented?
How does the acquisition workforce view the documentation of JCIDS and
NSSAP processes?

1.5 Scope
The scope of research is within the capability level and program level. The
capability level includes capabilities that are delivered in a hierarchical and/or networked
system-of-systems or independent system. From the capability level, identifying possible
areas for improvement within JCIDS requires examination of an Analysis-of-Alternatives
(AoA) trade capability, the definition of capability areas, and the DoD Architecture
Framework (DoDAF).
At the program level, this thesis examines the ability for a system’s horizontal
integration with other systems, the integration of increments with other increments, and
the ability of the acquisition strategy to reflect the entire scenario. For specific examples,
interviewees were asked to comment on any of three programs. Those programs were the
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), the Space Based Infrared System
(SBIRS), and the Transformational Satellite Communication (TSAT) System.
1.6 Methodology
This thesis uses a qualitative case study to frame the gap between a capabilitybased JCIDS and NSSAP and identify trade spaces in a number of areas which may
improve the interaction between the systems. The literature review examined research to
date on the topic of project management, including both commercial and military
practices, as well as available documentation of the DoD process and specific cases.
Additional information was gathered from field interviews with various organizations
4

involved in the process. After analyzing the interview and documentation data, a theory
and recommendations are presented to the acquisition workforce in this thesis. The thesis
will be verified and validated in defense.
1.7 Limitations
There are several limitations worth stating, although other limitations surely exist.
The first is that only the interaction between the JCIDS and the DAS is examined. The
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process is not examined to
reduce the complexity of the thesis and because the PPBE Process is largely out of the
DoD’s control.
Another limitation is the unique focus on space systems. The results produced
may vary with non-space programs. Space systems are excellent candidates to make
improvements in their acquisition process, due to their history of cost overruns and
schedule slips. In this thesis space system affordability is defines simply completing a
program within budget. Also, the seeming willingness to develop a system that addresses
their specific needs as exemplified by the adoption of the NSSAP 03-01, and the
characteristics of their systems that make capability-based “requirements,” systems-ofsystems architectures, and evolutionary strategies so appropriate makes this research
appropriate.
Finally, the resulting recommendations, although based on the acquisition
workforce interviews and documentation and reviewed in defense, will be untested in
case study.

5

1.8 Significance
This work is highly significant because of its timely relevance and scope. The
question of how to improve the acquisition process is arguably one of the most important
questions facing the space community, acquisition community, and DoD at large – it is a
key component of defense transformation. The resulting recommendations may serve as
an outline of a blueprint for modifying the acquisition process to accommodate the new
concept of capability-based acquisitions.

6

II. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will address the events and ideas leading to the development of the
current Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and National
Security Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP) as described in the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCSI) Instruction/Manual (I/M)3170.01 and National Security Space
Acquisition Policy 03-01 (NSSAP 03-01). The chapter will provide a brief overview of
the current decision support systems that make up the Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics process before highlighting some of the major ideas that characterize and
history of the JCIDS and NSSAP, current areas of concern and research, and official
documentation.
2.2 DoD Decision Support Systems
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG, 2004), the purpose of
the Department of Defense (DoD) Decision Support Systems is that “the three systems
provide an integrated approach to strategic planning, identification of needs for military
capabilities, systems acquisition, and program and budget development.” The three
systems include the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), the
Defense Acquisition System (DAS) for non-space programs or the National Security
Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP) for space programs, and the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process. Each of these three systems
are governed by different documentation and authorities, but frequently affect the same

7

people and events throughout the life time of an acquisition program, as illustrated by the
use of a Venn Diagram in Figure 2.01.

Figure 2.01 – DoD Decision Support Systems (DAG, 2004)

CJCS 3170.01 Series
Joint Capabilities
Integration
& Development
System (JCIDS)
VCJCS/JROC
Oversight

DoD 7000.14-R

Planning,
Programming,
Budgeting,
& Execution
(PPBE) Process

Defense
Acquisition
System
Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA)
Oversight

DEPSECDEF
Oversight

DoDD 5000.1
DoDI 5000.2

As mentioned previously, the appropriate acquisition decision support systems for
DoD space systems is the National Security Space Acquisition Process which replaces
the Defense Acquisition System, or blue circle on the lower left, in the figure above.
Also, some sources refer to the PPBE Process as the PPBE System (PPBES) such as the
OSD Comptroller’s website. These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this
document. A correct illustration of the decision support systems for space would look
something like the image in Figure 2.02.
8

Figure 2.02 – DoD Decision Support Systems – Space (after DAG, 2004)

CJCS 3170.01 Series
Joint Capabilities
Integration
& Development
System (JCIDS)
VCJCS/JROC
Oversight

National Security
Space Acquisition
Process (NSSAP)
USecAF as
DoD Space MDA
Oversight

DoD 7000.14-R

Planning,
Programming,
Budgeting,
& Execution
(PPBE) Process
DEPSECDEF
Oversight

DoDD 5000.1
NSSAP 03-01

In reality, the center overlap portion of the diagram is much larger and represents
the area where all acquisition programs fall.

Constant interaction and coordination

between all three systems results in the most effective acquisition programs (NSSAP 0301, 2004).
2.2.1 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
The top, yellow circle represents the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS).

Oversight for the JCIDS is provided by the Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council The
CJCSI CJCSM 3170.01 provide guidance for the JCIDS. The JCIDS is “the systematic
9

method established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for assessing gaps in military joint
warfighting capabilities and recommending solutions to resolve these gaps” (DAG,
2004).
2.2.2 National Security Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP)
In the above figures, the lower left, blue circle represents the Defense Acquisition
System (DAS) or the National Security Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP). The DAS
is the process that guides acquisition programs (DAG, 2004) that meet capability
deficiencies recognized by the JCIDS. The NSSAP does this for space systems by taking
into account the differences between space systems and terrestrial (including air) systems.
Specifically, “the NSS model emphasizes the decision needs for ‘high-tech’ small
quantity NSS programs, versus the DoD 5000 model that is typically focused on making
the best large quantity production decision. The funding profile for a typical NSS
program is usually front-loaded when compared to a production-focused system. This
requires the key decisions for a NSS program to be phased earlier than the typical DoD
5000 milestone decisions” (NSSAP 03-01, 2004).
Oversight is the responsibility of the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), like
in the traditional Defense Acquisition System (DAS) for non-space programs. However,
unlike the DAS, the MDA for space programs is the Under Secretary of the Air Force
(USecAF). The National Security Space community includes the national intelligence
community’s (IC) space programs, in addition to the DoD’s space programs. However
the IC acquisition policy is the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Directive 82-2b,
Acquisition Management - Directive 7, while DoD systems are governed by the National
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Security Space Acquisition Policy (again, NSSAP) 03-01 in place of the DAS’s DoDI
5000.2.
The National Security Space Acquisition Process for DoD Space Systems is still
governed by DoD Directive 5000.1 in addition to NSSAP 03-01. The relationship with
DoDI 5000.2 appears to be less clear. NSSAP 03-01 (2004) makes mention in section
3.3 of the space MDA’s right to waiver or exempt space programs from having to follow
provisions of DoDI 5000.2 if a program submits a memorandum applying for such a
waiver or exemption. That excerpt is listed below:

3.3 DoDI 5000.2 Waiver and Exemption
The Space Milestone Decision Authority is authorized to
approve waivers and exemptions to provisions of DoD
instructions or publications, as defined by DoD Directive
5025.1, to the extent that the instruction or publication, and
its subject matter, are under the jurisdiction of
USD(AT&L). To use this process, SPD/PMs can request a
waiver through their PEO and CAE via a memo to the DoD
Space MDA. Once the DoD Space MDA has granted the
waiver and exemption, it remains valid for the life of the
program unless the DoD Space MDA rescinds the waiver.
(The DoD Space MDA waiver authority does not include
DoDD 5000.1 or other DoD Directives.) For DoD Space
Non-MDAPs, the appropriate CAE or CAE-designated
representative (e.g., PEO) has the authority to establish
basic acquisition practices and to act as the MDA following
DoDI 5000.2 or this policy with approved waiver. (NSSAP
03-01, 2004)
However, a memorandum from the Under Secretary of the Air Force states that
“the NSS Acquisition Policy 03-01 falls under the authority of DoD Directive 5000.1 and
will be used for DoD Space Major Defense Acquisition Programs, replacing processes
and procedures described in the DoD Instruction 5000.2 under the jurisdiction of the
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Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD-AT&L)”
(USecAF, 2003).
2.2.3 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process is “the
Department's strategic planning, program development, and resource determination
process. The PPBE process is used to craft plans and programs that satisfy the demands
of the National Security Strategy within resource constraints” (DAG, 2004). Oversight
for the PPBE Process is provided by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Guidance is
provided by DoD 7000.14-R.
Although the PPBE Process is one of the three DoD decision support systems,
only the interaction between the JCIDS and the NSSAP will be examined in this research.
The PPBE Process has greater external interaction than the other two systems in
determining how the process operates. Plus, setting aside the PPBE Process narrows the
scope of the research to something more manageable given the time constraint to
complete the research.
2.3 Themes in Literature
Throughout the course of literature review, several themes or points of discussion
became evident. These themes were consistent among the majority of reviewed articles,
though not necessarily grouped in the same manner. The following sections provide a
brief summary of some of the most common themes related to the JCIDS and NSSAP.
Those themes are:
•
•

Acquisition Reform
Transformation, Modernization, and Recapitalization
12

•
•
•
•

Capabilities v. Requirements
Technology
Evolutionary Acquisitions
Alternative System Development Strategies

2.3.1 Acquisition Reform
One characteristic of today’s National Security Space Acquisition Process is its
emergence from a 20-year reform effort. Table 2.01 shows updates to the three decision
support systems that make up the process of identifying needs and providing solutions to
the warfighter. Behind the updated documents in the table are countless memorandums,
directives, codes, instructions, guides, references, architecture frameworks, public laws,
circulars, and orders supporting various aspects of, or replaced by, the guiding
documents.

Even without knowing all of these interim, supporting, or amending

documents, a pattern in reform is evident from the top-level documents alone. For
example, the decision support documents of 1991 remained unchanged until 1996. The
documents from 1996 were changed by 1999 and have been changed every year since.
Not only have the documents been reissued, but the document-types and names of the
decision support system have changed since 1999.
Why the emphasis on reform? “We have experienced breaches in nearly every
major acquisition program and these breaches are unacceptable” (Lord, 2006). Breaches
mean violations of the terms specified in the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) of a
program, pertaining to cost, schedule, and performance. In other words, many of our
systems are over cost, behind schedule, and failing to meet original performance
requirements.
This is not news to the space community. Air Force Space Command’s (AFSPC)
quarterly journal High Frontier, dedicated its entire January issue to the subject of space
13

Table 2.01 – Changes in the Decision Support Systems in the Last Fifteen Years
1991

Requirements Generation System
CJCS MOP 77

Acquisition Management System
DoD 5000 Series, 1991

1992

Requirements Generation System
CJCS MOP 77

Acquisition Management System
DoD 5000 Series, 1991

1993

Requirements Generation System
CJCS MOP 77

Acquisition Management System
DoD 5000 Series, 1991

1994

Requirements Generation System
CJCS MOP 77

Acquisition Management System
DoD 5000 Series, 1991

1995

Requirements Generation System
CJCS MOP 77

Acquisition Management System
DoD 5000 Series, 1991

1996

Requirements Generation System
CJCS MOP 77

Acquisition Management System
DoD 5000 Series, 1996

1997

Requirements Generation System
CJCS MOP 77

Acquisition Management System
DoD 5000 Series, 1996

1998

Requirements Generation System
CJCS MOP 77

Acquisition Management System
DoD 5000 Series, 1996

1999

Requirements Generation System
CJCS 3170 Series, 1999

Acquisition Management System
DoD 5000 Series, 1996

2000

Requirements Generation System
CJCS 3170 Series, 1999

Defense Acquisition System
DoD 5000 Series, 2000

2001

Requirements Generation System
CJCS 3170 Series, 2001

Defense Acquisition System
DoD 5000 Series, 2000

2002

Requirements Generation System
CJCS 3170 Series, 2001

Defense Acquisition System
DoD 5000 Series, 2002

2003

Joint Capabilities Integration &
Decision System
CJCS 3170 Series, 2003

2004

Joint Capabilities Integration &
Decision System
CJCS 3170 Series, 2004

2005

Joint Capabilities Integration &
Decision System
CJCS 3170 Series, 2005

Defense Acquisition System
DoD 5000 Series, 2003 & National
Security Space Acquisition Process
NSSAP 03-01, 2003
Defense Acquisition System
DoD 5000 Series, 2003 & National
Security Space Acquisition Process
NSSAP 03-01, 2004
Defense Acquisition System
DoD 5000 Series, 2003 & National
Security Space Acquisition Process
NSSAP 03-01, 2004
14

Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7045.14, 1984
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7045.14, 1984
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7045.14, 1984
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7000.14, 1994
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7000.14, 1994
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7000.14, 1994
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7000.14, 1994
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7000.14, 1994
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7000.14, 1994
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7000.14, 2000
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7000.14, 2001
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System
DoDD 7000.14, 2002
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution
Process
DoDD 7000.14, 2002
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution
Process
DoDD 7000.14, 2002
Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution
Process
DoDD 7000.14, 2002

acquisitions, past, present, and future. Within the 56 pages, 13 senior space professionals
described past problems and circumstances and present day factors that have led to the
outcome of today’s “over cost, behind schedule, and below performance” reality for
many space programs. Both Gen Lord and LtGen Hamel sited events in the 1990s as
contributors to today’s problems. "Acquisition reform errors of the 1990s left us with a
severe lack of expertise in cost estimating, system engineering, and program
management" (Lord, 2006). And, “in the early 1990s, the Cold War ended, defense
budgets were cut…the Air Force systemically cut back its development and acquisition
workforce and delayed its recapitalization plans” (Hamel, 2006). They also pointed out
improvements that could or had already been made and all presented an impression of
hopefulness for the future. BrigGen Pawlikowski concluded her article by summarizing
the space acquisition community’s mission. “We must deliver systems that are fully
integrated into effects capability even if that means leading multiple diverse programs
within a concurrent development environment. This is our mission in support of our
warfighters; failure is not an option. The space acquisition community is postured to
meet this mission. We will overcome the devastating effects of the experiments in
acquisition reform in the 1990s.”
Many of the authors cited a number of reports on acquisition reform when
discussing the basis for their recommendations. While the experiences and opinions of
senior leadership is valuable, these reports are the most rigorous research on the subject
of acquisition reform. In the last twenty years, countless organizations and panels have
looked at the issues surrounding acquisition reform, such as the 1986 Blue Ribbon
Commission—“Packard Commission,” the 1990s DSB reports, the 2000 Launch Broad
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Area Review, the 2001 Space Commission Report—“Rumsfeld Commission,” the 2003
Defense Science Board—“Young Panel,” and most recently the 2005 Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Project. In addition to all of these, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has provided a number of valuable reports
pertaining to space acquisition reform.
The following sections examine those findings and recommendations that pertain
specifically to the JCIDS and NSSAP and were present in other articles and research.
One item that was not present in literature, other than in the commission report, but was a
frequent topic in interviews was a recommendation from the Young Panel. The Young
Panel recommended that the space funding profile should represent 80% for development
and production and 20% for operations and maintenance with a 25% margin for program
managers.

Another interesting characteristic of the recommendations and problems

identified by senior leadership and expert panels is that at times the findings are very
similar to those of the past and at other times, the exact opposite action is prescribed. For
example, the concept of Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) was a strategy
used to procure SBIRS, based on 1994 DAS policy (then called Acquisition Management
System).

LtGen Michael Hamel commented that “the responsibility for program

management was largely shifted to, and shouldered by, the defense industry. The
construct was known as Total System Performance Responsibility, wherein industry was
expected to deliver end-to-end systems. Defense contractors were given broad authority
to interpret performance requirements, define system designs, establish statements of
work and deliverable items, and use commercial ‘best practices.’” (Hamel, 2006) LtGen
Hamel continued to say that the concept resulted in lack of government oversight and
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mission failure. However, in 2003, Dr. Addelston made a compelling case for using it to
allow contractors to develop end-to-end system-of-systems based on a government
CONOPS (Addelston, 2003). This fluctuation may reflect the difficulty in developing a
comprehensive system that is still flexible or it may indicate that something else is wrong
other than the system.
2.3.2 Transformation, Modernization, and Recapitalization
Another theme prevalent in many articles focusing on all processes associated
with DoD acquisitions, is the concept of “Transformation.”

Transformation simply

means to change or modernize many aspects of the DoD to be more flexible to threats
(Myers, 2001).

The Defenselink Transformation website provides the following

overview to describe transformation:
The Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States
accelerated the need to transform to better meet the
challenges of the 21st century, thus, sustain American
competitive advantage in warfare.
Transformation is foremost a continuing process that does
not have an end point. It is meant to create or anticipate the
future. Transformation is meant to deal with the coevolution of concepts, processes, organizations and
technology. Change in any one of these areas necessitates
change in all.
Transformation is meant to create new competitive areas
and new competencies. It is meant to identify, leverage and
even create new underlying principles for the way things
are done. Transformation is meant to identify and leverage
new sources of power. The overall objective of these
changes is simply – sustained American competitive
advantage in warfare. (Defenselink Transformation
Website, 2006)
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Transformation was not born from the 9-11 terror attacks. It was included in the
Space Commission’s January 2001 Report. The Space Commission defined it similarly
as to “develop, deploy, and maintain the means to deter attack on and to defend
vulnerable space capabilities…this requires a deterrence strategy for space, which in turn
must be supported by a broader range of space capabilities” (Space Commission, 2001).
The Space Commission defined these capabilities necessary to space transformation as:
Deterrence and Defense, Policy for Space Assured Access to Space and On-Orbit
Operations, Space Situational Awareness, Earth Surveillance from Space, Global
Command, Control and Communications in Space, Defense in Space, Homeland
Defense, and Power Projection In, From, and Through Space

(Space Commission,

2001).
In fact, the concept of transformation, or modernization, has been around for
some time. A Feb 1995 DoD news release on the FY 1996-97 Defense Budget quoted
Secretary Perry saying that the budget would be used in part for “prudent weapons
modernization” (DoD, 1995).

The article later substituted recapitalization for

modernization when it said that “The new budget plans also begin the ‘recapitalization’
of U.S. forces--that is, the modernization of weapons and equipment, after several years
in which the Department lived off its Cold War stocks of equipment” (DoD, 1995). And
even as recently as June of 2005, while testifying before the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) during his confirmation hearing, Gen Moseley stated that
recapitalization of the aging aircraft fleet was his third priority (third to improving joint
warfighting and strengthening Air Force people) (Gettle, 2005).
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The concepts of modernizing, recapitalization, and transformation as synonyms is
not new. However, today’s usage implies that recapitalization specifically applies to
modernizing weapon systems after a period of allowing systems to remain at the status
quo and fall behind state of the art. Transformation has also become more clearly
defined.

In 2003, the Secretary of Defense published the Transformation Planning

Guidance. Within the document, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that transformation is more
than modernizing weapon systems in that it includes continually transforming our people,
processes, and military forces “so that our armed forces are always several steps ahead of
any potential adversary” and can react quickly to whatever the threat may be including
terrorist attacks, cyber-war attacks, traditional state-on-state attacks, etc. (DoD TPG,
2003).
The document also specifies that transformation efforts will occur in three areas:
how we fight, how we do business, and how we work with others (DoD TPG, 2003).
Transforming how we fight means supporting the four pillars of transformation identified
in the 2001 QDR and pictured in Figure 2.03.

Figure 2.03 – 2001 QDR Transformation Pillars (DoD TPG, 2003)
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The Office of Force Transformation has established the following five goals, which
closely mirror those of the 2001 QDR and support the pillars. Those goals are listed
below:
1. Make force transformation a pivotal element of national
defense strategy and DoD corporate strategy effectively
supporting the four strategic pillars of the national military
strategy.
2. Change the force and its culture from the bottom up
through the use of experimentation, transformational
articles (operational prototyping) and the creation and
sharing of new knowledge and experiences.
3. Implement Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as the theory
of war for the information age and the organizing principle
for national military planning and joint concepts,
capabilities and systems.
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4. Get the decision rules and metrics right and cause them to
be applied enterprise wide.
5. Discover, create or cause to be created new military
capabilities to broaden the capabilities base and mitigate
risk. (Office of Force Transformation Website, 2005)
Transforming how we do business includes a number of efforts; most notable is
“adaptive planning, a more entrepreneurial, future-oriented capabilities-based resource
allocation planning process, accelerated acquisition cycles built on spiral development,
output-based management, and a reformed analytic support agenda” (DoD TPG, 2003).
Furthermore, reforming the acquisition process is a top priority (DoD TPG, 2003). “The
Department [of Defense] is reducing acquisition cycle time and aligning acquisition with
a new capabilities-based resource allocation process built around joint operating
concepts. Instead of building plans, operations and doctrine around individual military
systems as often occurred in the past, henceforth the Department will explicitly link
acquisition strategy to future joint concepts in order to provide the capabilities necessary
to execute future operations” (DoD TPG, 2003).
Acquisition reform, whether a new concept or not, was clearly needed as
demonstrated by the multitude of GAO, DSB, and other special panels chartered to look
at the Acquisition process discussed in section 2.2.1. That need was brought to the
forefront after the events of 9-11 demonstrated interagency communication weaknesses
and drastically different threats than DoD had prepared for through traditional methods of
adjusting Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and
Facilities (DOTMLPF). Therefore, the concept of transformation, though introduced
before 9-11, gained substantial support because it represented more than system
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modernization or recapitalization. It also emphasized joint activities, the development of
a net-centric environment, and promoting changes across the DOTMLPF spectrum.
2.3.3 Capabilities v. Requirements
In May of 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System
(JCIDS) replaced the Requirements Generation System (RGS) decision support system.
According to a briefing given by the Joint Staff, the former RGS had a number of
shortcomings including producing stove-piped systems that were not integrated with
other systems; producing service oriented requirements, rather than joint focused; lacking
an objective construct for proposal analyses; duplication of efforts in smaller programs;
and unprioritized joint warfighting needs. (Joint Staff / J8, 2005) Figure 2.04 compares
the former RGS with the new JCIDS.

Figure 2.04 – RGS v. JCIDS Comparison (Joint Staff / J8, 2005)
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In addition to the top-down, joint-approach, an additional JCIDS characteristic is
the prevalent use of the term “capability” and the reduced use of the term “requirements.”
This has led to discussion on what exactly is meant by capability and related terms such
as capability-based acquisitions. The governing document for the JCIDS process, CJCSI
3170 defines a capability [as] “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified
standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of
tasks” (CJCSI 3170, 2005).

Air Force Instruction 10-601, Capabilities Based

Requirements Development, defines capability as “the ability to execute a specified
course of action. It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational
terms in the format of an initial capabilities document (ICD) or a DOTMLPF change
recommendation. In the case of materiel proposals, the definition will progressively
23

evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the [capability development
document] CDD and the [capability production document] CPD” (AFI 10-601, 2004).
The DoD Dictionary defines capability as “the ability to execute a specified course of
action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.)” AFI 63-101,
Operations of Capability Based Acquisition System and AFPD 63-1, Capability-Based
Acquisition System do not define or refer to definitions of a capability.
The failure to adopt joint capability-based acquisitions in implementation and
across services was noted in a recent report by the Government Accountability Office,
titled “DoD Management Approach and Process Not Well-Suited to Support
Development of Global Information Grid (GIG).” In the report, the GAO stated that
“DoD program management and acquisition oversight tend to focus on individual
programs and not necessarily on synchronizing multiple programs to deliver
interdependent systems at the same time, as required to achieve the intended capability”
(GAO, 2006).
An additional characteristic of the JCIDS is the option of using an architecture
made of family-of-systems (FoS) or system-of-systems (SoS) as solutions.
identifies FoS and SoS as follows:
Family of Systems - A set of systems that provide similar
capabilities through different approaches to achieve similar
or complementary effects. For instance, the warfighter may
need the capability to track moving targets. The FoS that
provides this capability could include unmanned or manned
aerial vehicles with appropriate sensors, a space-based
sensor platform or a special operations capability. Each can
provide the ability to track moving targets, but with
differing characteristics of persistence, accuracy,
timeliness, etc.
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CJCSI

System of Systems - A set or arrangement of
interdependent systems that are related or connected to
provide a given capability. The loss of any part of the
system will significantly degrade the performance or
capabilities of the whole. The development of a SoS
solution will involve trade space between the systems as
well as within an individual system performance. An
example of a SoS would be a combat aircraft. While the
aircraft may be developed as a single system, it could
incorporate subsystems developed for other aircraft. For
example, the radar from an existing aircraft may be
incorporated into the one being developed rather than
developing a new radar. The SoS in this case would be the
airframe, engines, radar, avionics, etc. that make up the
entire combat aircraft capability. (CJCSI 3170.01, 2005)
The concept of joint, net-centric, SoS or FoS architectures has caused a number of
organizations to take a look at several areas within DoD acquisitions aside from those
associated with the oversight and review processes detailed in CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP
03-01.

In February of 2004, the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA)

Systems Engineering Division Modeling & Simulation (M&S) Community published
their findings on M&S support and how it related to the new DoD 5000 series. The
report had:
•
•
•
•

13 findings on the systems engineering process
35 findings regarding M&S
four recommendations on the use of M&S
12 recommendations on enabling the use of M&S (NDIA, 2004)
In April of 2005, the Aerospace Corporation published a draft rewrite of Military

Standard 499C, Systems Engineering—its first update since 1974. The document is one
example of LtGen Hamel’s “comprehensive fixes” at Space and Missile Systems Center
(SMC).

“These comprehensive fixes include reestablishing systems engineering

discipline, critical development processes, tailored military specifications and
standards…” (Hamel, 2006).

In addition to the implications of capability-based
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acquisitions on SE and M&S, testing and evaluation (T&E) is also under review. Col
Eileen Bjorkman is the Joint Test & Evaluation Methodology (JTEM) Feasibility Study
Director charged with “developing methods and processes for testing in a Joint
environment” (Bjorkman, 2005). As is the case with many Joint Acquisition activities,
Bjorkman says that relationships need to be established among competing processes and
organizations (Bjorkman, 2005).
2.3.4 Technology
The role of technology in the acquisition processes was another strong theme for
discussion in the literature.

These discussions included the military lag behind the

commercial world in technological advancements, DoD’s lag behind national space
systems, and incorporating immature technology into DoD systems.
A number of articles and reports highlighted a need “to give DOD access to those
technologies, products, and processes which are dominated by the commercial market
place. Electronics, software, computer systems, telecommunications, and flexible
manufacturing are example areas where commercial technology is far more advanced
than military technology” (DSB 1993).
Some articles stated that there was too much technology development during the
acquisition life cycle. In a speech given to a graduating class of the Defense Systems
Management Course, Mr. John Wilson said that the Acquisition community needed to
consciously separate technology development from acquisition (Johnson, 1999).
The 1993 DSB sited one problem with the acquisition process as “assuming ‘this
will be the last new system for the next two decades,’ and including all new (often
unproven) technology at the start of full-scale development, and adding new requirements
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to this same system over time” (DSB, 1993). Similarly, Mr. Wilson said “Because we
expect each generation of technology to be a revolutionary leap ahead of the last
generation, we try to fund requirements ten to fifteen years in the future. As the F-22
example demonstrates, not only does this practice cause us to design systems based on
our best guess of future threats and technology, which is often inaccurate, but it also
extends cycle times by making us repeatedly revise the program to incorporate new
developments” (Johnson, 1999). This problem begs the question: should defense system
technology be revolutionary or evolutionary?
According to the 1999 DSB, “there have been few revolutionary programs in the
past, that have succeeded without the strong support of the owning Service. Major
change almost always involves some leadership group who perceives a pending crisis. If
the DoD wants to make change, it must recognize the difficulty of sustaining funding
support for revolutionary changes, and then provide the leadership for giving such
programs funding stability” (DSB 1999).

Gen Hamel, among others (Sugar, 2006)

(Stevens, 2006), feel that “program stability is essential if we are to avoid continuous replanning and re-baselining, which inevitably causes delays and cost growth” (Hamel,
2006).
2.3.5 Evolutionary Acquisitions (EA)
Many believe that an evolutionary strategy, as opposed to a single step strategy
providing revolutionary change, will solve Acquisition’s problem of lengthy acquisition
cycle time. The Packard Commission stated that “an unreasonable long acquisition cycle
of 10 to 15 years for major weapons systems is a central problem from which most other
acquisition problems stem” (Packard, 1986) including obsolete technology, cost growth,
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and “gold plated” defense systems (Packard, 1986). Cycle time is the length of time it
takes to go from program initiation to initial operational capability (IOC) (Johnson,
1999). Figure 2.05 depicts the concept of acquisition cycle time according to the 1999
DSB.

Figure 2.05 – Acquisition Cycle Time (DSB, 1999)
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“Rather than aiming for a 100% solution that takes 20 years to complete, they will strive
for an 80% solution that can be fielded to the troops faster and at affordable prices.”
(Farrell, 2002) DoD supported this notion by stating that Evolutionary Acquisition (EA)
was the preferred method for acquiring weapon systems in the 2003 reissuance of the
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DoD 5000 series. The NSSAP 03-01 followed suit, also stating that EA was the
preferred method for developing space systems.
What is EA? According to DoDI 5000.2,
An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments,
recognizing, up front, the need for future capability
improvements. The objective is to balance needs and
available capability with resources, and to put capability
into the hands of the user quickly. The success of the
strategy depends on consistent and continuous definition of
requirements, and the maturation of technologies that lead
to disciplined development and production of systems that
provide increasing capability towards a materiel concept….
The approaches to achieve evolutionary acquisition require
collaboration between the user, tester, and developer. They
include:
Spiral Development - In this process, a desired capability is
identified, but the end-state requirements are not known at
program initiation. Those requirements are refined through
demonstration and risk management; there is continuous
user feedback; and each increment provides the user the
best possible capability. The requirements for future
increments depend on feedback from users and technology
maturation.
Incremental Development - In this process, a desired
capability is identified, an end-state requirement is known,
and that requirement is met over time. (DoDI 5000.2,
2003)

NSSAP 03-01 defines EA similarly and goes on to say that “evolutionary
acquisition has been a cornerstone for space system development since the early 1960’s”
(NSSAP, 2004) even though the recognition in DoD has been fairly recent and can be
traced back to DoD computer system acquisition (Farkas, 2003).
Traces of an evolutionary concept can be found dating back to the 1930s when
Walter Shewhart of Bell Labs proposed a series of small “Plan-Do-Study-Act” cycles, a

29

concept referred to as PDSA, to improve the quality of products. (Larman, 2003) W.
Edwards Deming, also a quality expert, promoted PDSA in the 1940s and included it in
his 1986 book Out of the Crisis (Deming, 1986). In the 1950s, the X-15 hypersonic jet
incorporated an iterative and incremental development, or IID, strategy. NASA credited
some of the success of the project to the IID strategy. The IID strategy was also used on
NASA’s software for the Project Mercury program (Larman, 2003). It was in the mid1950s that IID became widely accepted in the software programming community. In
1976, Tom Gilb introduced the concept of evolutionary project management and in the
mid-1980s TRW’s Barry Boehm coined the term “Spiral Development” (Larman, 2003).
Figure 2.06 illustrates Boehm’s concept of spiral development.
In the spiral model, the desired capability is achieved at the end of the entire
spiral. Boehm’s model releases prototypes for testing, but does not consider them to be
solutions. Some consider the spiral model to be a system production model (Unger,
2003) but apply different steps than the one developed by Boehm. Unger describes
product development models that use time or budget constraints to mark the end of a
development phase. The automobile industry for example, makes a number of upgrades
or modifications in about 18 months, fast enough to have a new edition of the Ford
Explorer available each year. This is an example of time-block product development and
an evolutionary strategy, but it is made possible through a fairly mature prototype that
remains constant.

Software engineering is another industry that releases mature

prototypes without requiring too many spirals.
Figure 2.06 – Spiral Development (Boehm, 2001)
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The National Security Space Acquisition Process’ application treats prototypes as
militarily useful, improved capability systems that may or may not be brought to the
same level as the final capability, when the spiral is completed. The ability to bring an
earlier system to the same level as a new system presents problems for space systems
since only software can be upgraded on a launched satellite at this time. Capability is
generally added in following generations of satellites by designing them to be backward
compatible with earlier generations.
This may seem similar to block development or preplanned product improvement
(P3I) and in some ways, it is; which is why the space community says that they have been
using EA strategies for years (NSSAP 03-01, 2004).
following definitions:
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Pete Aldridge published the

Increment or Block - A militarily useful and supportable
operational capability that can be effectively developed,
produced or acquired, deployed, and sustained. Each
increment of capability will have its own set of thresholds
and objectives set by the user.
Preplanned Product Improvement - A traditional
acquisition strategy that provides for adding improved
capability to a mature system. (Aldridge, 2002)
In DoD’s application of EA, EA (spiral or incremental), block development, and P3I
ALL result in blocks or increments. The difference is in the expected capability. EA
shoots for an 80% solution upgraded over time, block shoots for a 100% solution with
each successive block, and P3I shoots for a 100% solution with planned upgrades to
follow (Farkas & Farmer, 2005). Figure 2.07 is from Crosstalk Magazine and attempts to
capture these concepts (Crosstalk, 2002).

Figure 2.07 – EA Visualization (Crosstalk, 2002)
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Mr. David Brown, of the Technology and Engineering Department in the Defense
Acquisition University (DAU), briefed the following figure at the 2005 Space Systems
Engineering and Acquisition Excellence Forum.

Figure 2.08 – Linear Sequential Acquisition Process v. Evolutionary Acquisition Process
(Brown, 2005)

2.3.6 System Development Strategies
To software and systems engineers, as well as civilian project managers,
traditional, spiral, and incremental development are defined and illustrated differently
than the DoD definitions. To the DoD, the use of spiral or incremental development is
determined by knowledge of an end state. DoD deploys improved usable systems at the
end of a development phase. Adding to some of the confusion, aside from definitions
differing from the systems engineering community or commercial practices, is the
inconsistency in images to portray DoD’s definitions. The following sections address
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various development strategies used commercially, grounded in systems engineering,
software development, and project management practices.
The Project Management Institute summarizes a number of development methods
in a paper titled “Software Development and Linearity.” The paper describes “generally
accepted” (Wideman, 2003) program management practices in software development,
which is appropriate for all DoD space systems because of their software complexity and
the push towards interoperability in a joint community through netcentricity.
The first model discussed is the waterfall model, picture in Figure 2.09; the
waterfall model is also pictured in Figure 2.09 as the linear-sequential acquisition
process. Wideman describes “good” and “not so good” features of the waterfall model.

Figure 2.09 – The Waterfall Model (Buede, 2000)
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•
•
•

•
•
•

Good Features:
The waterfall approach has been around for a long time, and many people
are familiar and comfortable with it.
It is simple and easily understood.
It does recognize the need to move one stage at a time and recycle back to
the previous stage to validate the stage outcome. (Wideman, 2003)
Not So Good Features:
The waterfall model approach does not satisfy the requirement for
executive control.
It is very difficult to manage under conditions of complexity.
In the waterfall approach, integration and testing is generally left until the
end. That’s when “all the chickens come home to roost,” with disastrous
effect on project cost and schedule. (Wideman, 2003)
The second model discussed is the “Vee Model” pictured in Figure 2.10. The

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) uses a similar model. That model is pictured in
Figure 2.11 with an overlay showing when key reviews take place.
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Good Features:
Most people who have an engineering background are very comfortable
with the systems approach.
It is very good wherever it is possible to describe, i.e. specify, the
requirements with high degree of certainty
The acquiring authority requires a thoroughly well-documented track
record or audit trail
Consequently, it is popular with big government departments,…
Where money is not the limiting criteria, though competitive bidding
might be. (Wideman, 2003)
Not So Good Features:
The process is heavy on documentation.
It assumes that it is possible to arrive at near-perfect documentation that is
complete, and is truly representative of the ultimate “requirements,”…
And can be frozen, and the authors, i.e. the stakeholders, can be held
accountable to those requirement specifications. (Wideman, 2003)
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Figure 2.10 – The Vee Model (Buede, 2000)

Figure 2.11 – The NRO Vee Model (NRO, 2000)
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The third model discussed is the spiral model. Wideman points out that spiral
development means different things to different people (Wideman, 2003) but takes the
most classical view in his interpretation that it consists of four management processes
with four cycles through those processes (Wideman, 2003).

The four phases are:

identify, design, construct, and evaluate. The four cycles are:
Proof-of-concept cycle — define the business goals,
capture the requirements, develop a conceptual design,
construct a "proof-of-concept", establish test plans, conduct
a risk analysis. Share results with user.
First-build cycle — derive system requirements, develop
logic design, construct first build, evaluate results. Share
results with user.
Second-build cycle — derive subsystem requirements,
produce physical design, construct second build, evaluate
results. Share results with user.
Final-build cycle — derive unit requirements, produce final
design, construct final build, test all levels. Seek user
acceptance. (Wideman, 2003)
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Good Features:
In this approach, the entire application is built working with the user.
Any gaps in requirements are identified as work progresses into more
detail.
The process is continued until the code is finally accepted.
The diagrammatic representation, i.e. the spiral, does convey very clearly
the cyclic nature of the process.
And it also conveys the progression through the project life plan.
(Wideman, 2003)
Not So Good Features:
This approach requires serious discipline on the part of the users.
If the users are not responsible for the schedule and budget, as very often
they are not, executive control can be difficult.
For a software developer working under a firm-price contract, it may be
impossible.
The model depicts four cycles. However, if cycles are added indefinitely
for “just one more tweak” then eventually…Everyone gives up in
frustration!
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•

Or, the time and money runs out.(Wideman, 2003)
Like Wideman, Boehm and Brown both warn against incorporating too many

spirals, or creating a program management “death spiral” (Brown, 2004) resulting in
running out of patience, time, and money; however, DoD’s definition of spiral
development makes no stipulation as to the end date for a capability or system
development.
Buede discusses a fourth development model that seems to more closely resemble
the chart published by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) illustrating the interaction between the three decision support
systems. This model describes incremental development using the Vee Model and is
pictured below in Figure 2.12. Under this model, a useful subset of the system is
produced initially followed by upgrades and system expansions until the entire system is
operational. (Buede, 2000) This definition seems most similar to the DoD definition for
Spiral and Incremental Development, without referring to the user’s role or knowledge of
the desired end state. Buede also points out that while some people believe that one
needs to choose between the traditional Vee or the Spiral model, research has shown
“that the spiral activities can be mapped onto the Vee model without swapping any
activities in time.” Both the Iterative Vee and the Spiral-mapped Vee are pictured below
in Figures 2.12 and 2.13.
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Figure 2.12 – The Iterative Vee (Buede, 2000)
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Figure 2.13 – The Spiral-mapped Vee (after Buede,
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2.4 Summary
This chapter introduced the DoD decision support system, with an emphasis on
the JCIDS and NSSAP.

Documentation, research, and articles pertaining to these

decision support systems was reviewed and presented by major theme, for the purpose of
answering the investigative questions listed in Chapter One and shaping the additional
research described in Chapter Three.
Acquisition challenges have existed since the days of George Washington (Lord,
2006). But the string of modifications, some minor and many major, indicate that
acquisition reform is a real issue because an acceptable policy has not been developed or
has not been implemented properly.
The 2001 QDR and 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance identify very
clearly, a number of objectives for DoD transformation—acquisitions included. Those
objectives are further highlighted in the JCIDS and NSSAP guiding documentation and
can be summarized as joint operations, intelligence exploitation (through netcentricity),
developing new warfighting concepts (capability-based), and delivering new capability
(evolutionary). However, supporting documentation specifying implementation of these
concepts appears to be absent or to not have been considered such as the need for
capability management of SoS engineering (SoSE).

This absence causes confusion

between capabilities and requirements and between evolutionary acquisitions and its
development processes, and results in no significant operational change in space system
procurement. Technology issues were also discussed—specifically the debate between
using evolutionary or revolutionary strategies to incorporate technology. The literature
review closed with a brief explanation of how DoD and the commercial world define an
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evolutionary strategy and system development strategies to develop the technical
composition of a system.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will address the qualitative procedure, the research design type, the
researcher’s role, the data collection procedures, the data analysis procedures, and the
steps taken to verify the research.
3.2 A Qualitative Procedure
The format of this chapter has been closely modeled after Creswell’s account of a
qualitative procedure in Chapter Nine of his book titled Research Design: Qualitative
and Quantitative Approaches (Creswell, 1994).

This methodology will describe a

qualitative procedure, the case study design, the researcher’s role, the data collection
procedures, the data analysis procedures, and the steps taken to verify the research.
3.2.1 Why Qualitative?
The purpose of this research is to identify how effective the integrated
deployment of the CJCSI 3170 and the NSSAP 03-01 has been for national space
systems.

This problem requires a qualitative approach for a number of reasons,

supported by Morse.
Characteristics of a qualitative research problem are: (a) the
concept is ‘immature’ due to a conspicuous lack of theory
and previous research; (b) a notion that the available theory
may be inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased; (c) a
need exists to explore and describe the phenomena and to
develop theory; or (d) the nature of the phenomenon may
not be suited to quantitative measures (Morse, 1991).
Such a problem as the one examined in this research fits a number of the above
characteristics in one way or another, but most significantly fits characteristics a and c.
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As the literature review in chapter two has shown, there is very little scientific research
that has been conducted on the matter. While some literature on product development is
available, usually pertaining to the commercial world, the overall concept of identifying
military deficiencies and translating those into solutions is extremely limited. Much of
the literature looking at this problem seems to focus on identifying broad problems with
the entire system and lacks a validated proposal of theory or solutions, and is limited to
the authors’ experiences.
As for characteristic b, this research makes no suggestion that the existing process
and acquisition theory is “inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased.” Instead, it
attempts to simply identify the effectiveness of implementation at this point for three
space programs and if applicable, identify areas for improvement.
Due to the complexity of the process and the need for more research on the
subject, this research is not suited for a quantitative approach at this time—not to say that
a quantitative approach will never be applicable. Quantitative approaches are excellent
for removing or accounting for biases and assumptions, if those are known and can be
controlled.
3.2.2 The Assumptions of Qualitative Designs
Although a qualitative approach is definitely appropriate for the proposed
problem, it is important to understand the assumptions that accompany such an approach.
Merriam describes those as follows.
1. Qualitative researchers are concerned primarily with
process, rather than outcomes or products.
2. Qualitative researchers are interested in meaning—how
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people make sense of their lives, experiences, and their
structures of the world.
3. The qualitative researcher is the primary instrument for
data collection and analysis. Data are mediated through
this human instrument, rather than through inventories,
questionnaires, or machines.
4. Qualitative research involves fieldwork. The researcher
physically goes to the people, setting, site, or institution to
observe or record behavior in its natural setting.
5. Qualitative research is descriptive in that the researcher
is interested in process, meaning, and understanding gained
through words or pictures.
6. The process of qualitative research is inductive in that
the researcher builds abstractions, concepts, hypotheses,
and theories from details (Merriam, 1988).
These assumptions will be readily apparent in the next section describing the
design type.
3.3 The Type of Design
3.3.1 Specific Qualitative Design
There are a number of research strategies that apply to problems involving the
social sciences. Determining which strategy to use depends on the form of the research
question, the researcher’s ability to control surrounding events, and whether or not the
focus is on contemporary events (Yin, 2003). For the problem proposed, a case study
will best answer the question because a case study answers how and why questions, does
not require control of the environment, and focuses on contemporary events (Yin, 2003).
In contrast, an experiment could answer the same questions and focus on contemporary
events as well, but would require control of the environment. A historical strategy could
also answer the same questions and not require control of the environment, but would not
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focus on contemporary events.

These methods can be quantitative or qualitative;

however for the reasons mentioned in the previous section, the case study will be
qualitative in its application to this problem. Yin (2003) defines case studies with two
propositions:
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially
when
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident
2. The case study inquiry
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a
triangulating fashion, and as another result
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data
collection and analysis (Yin, 2003)

3.3.2 Characteristics of the Design
Case studies have five important components (Yin, 2003) that will be discussed in
the context of the problem this research addresses. Those components are a study’s
questions, propositions, unit of analysis, links between the data and propositions, and the
criteria for interpreting the findings.
Study Questions. The study question is the focus of the research. In this case, the
research attempts to answer how effective the integrated deployment of the CJCSI 3170
and the NSSAP 03-01 has been for national space systems.
Study Propositions. Propositions direct the focus of research and are frequently
present in social science research, unless the purpose of the research is exploratory. In
that case, such propositions are unnecessary because the exploration topic has already
been selected and does not require focus.
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There are three propositions within this

research effort. Those propositions are: (1) organizations at different levels in the process
may have a different understanding of what the new guidance proposes; (2) space
systems, following the same guidance, may implement the guidance differently; (3) the
decision process required for such guidance to be effective is inadequate.
Unit of Analysis. The unit of analysis to be studied is each stake holding
organization in the approval chain for a new system to be developed or an existing
system to be modified, based on an identified capability deficiency. These organizations
will be identified in the context of three space systems, making this a multiple case study.
The last two components, Linking Data to Propositions and Criteria for
Interpreting the Findings will be discussed as Data Analysis Procedures in section 3.6.
3.4 The Researcher’s Role
3.4.1 Past Experiences of Researcher
In June of 2002, the researcher was assigned to the MILSATCOM (Military
Satellite Communications) Joint Program Office (MJPO). The Joint Program Office had
a number of interesting roles in addition to being a traditional System Program Office
(SPO). The organization was comprised of personnel from the Air Force, Army, and
Navy, reflecting their joint interest in the mission and success of the programs. MJPO
did not house a single satellite; rather, the program office was responsible for the
management of a number of satellite programs in various stages of development, colocated at Los Angeles AFB and Hanscom AFB. Additionally, the MJPO managed the
acquisition of the necessary terminals to communicate with the satellites, being
developed at Hanscom AFB. A program office managing both the satellites and their
respective terminals was traditionally referred to as a “basket SPO.” Today, that scenario
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is more frequently described as an office managing a system-of-systems (SoS).
Similarly, a program office managing a number of similar functioning systems, such as
communication satellites (although they ultimately perform different missions at different
frequencies), is said to be an office managing a family-of-systems (FoS).
3.4.2 Selection Steps
Understanding the acquisition process, the author identified a number of
organizations to interview both vertically and horizontally. By vertical, organizations
were selected along an approving chain of command from top to bottom, requirements
generation to operator use. In this manner, data could be analyzed at all phases of an
acquisition program. By horizontal, the author asked the same questions at all levels, for
three different space programs. This would indicate if policies were implemented to the
same extent, or documented for exceptions, throughout space programs. Programs in
different phases of the acquisition process, meaning that some were initiated before and
after the policy change, were selected to maximize testing the extent of implementation.
Both organizations and programs selected for research were selected based on
criteria that would lead to diversified results enabling comparison. Specific interview
participants were selected based on the author’s contacts and “snowball sampling”—
asking the interview participants who they thought should be contacted.

Although

snowball sampling is considered to have a number of biases when studying social
interactions, those biases are mitigated by the fact that social relationships were not being
studied and outweighed by the value that snowball sampling can provide when it is
difficult to find interview participants.
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3.4.3 Human Subjects and Ethical Issues
Interview participants can be difficult to find for a number of reasons, but in this
particular case, one reason may be the fear of retribution resulting in negative
consequences since interview participants are being asked to comment on the
effectiveness of policies created by superiors. For this reason, all personal information
will remain completely confidential throughout the entire process, including thesis
publication and any related articles that may result. Additionally, the research was
approved through the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Human Subject Research
Approval process. This information was provided to the interview participant in an
interview invitation letter and before the interview was actually conducted.

The

interview invitation letter is located in Appendix A.
3.5 Data Collection Procedures
3.5.1 Parameters of Data Collection
Individuals from all levels of the Joint Capability Integrated Development System
(JCIDS) and the National Security Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP), as described in
Figure 2.02, were interviewed on location, whenever possible. Specifically, individuals
have been identified from the following offices.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

National Security Space Office (NSSO)
Secretary of the Air Force Directorate of Space Acquisitions (SAF/USA)
Headquarters Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air & Space Operations
(AF/XO)
Headquarters Air Force Space Command Directorate of Requirements
(AFSPC/A5)
Global Positioning System (GPS) Program Office, System Engineers
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Program Office, System Engineers, Users
Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) Program Office, System
Engineers
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•
•
•
•
•

Aerospace Corporation
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) Acquisition Center of Excellence
(ACE)
Defense Systems Management Course (DSMC) Instructors
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Instructors
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Instructors
The questions were focused on these individuals’ roles in the acquisition process,

before and after the implementation of CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP 03-01, as well as how
they view the roles of others. The questions also focused on the implementation of the
policies.
3.5.2 Types of Data Collected, Rationale, and Protocol
The interviews were comprised of, but not limited to, a standard set of questions
located below and again in Appendix B. The semi-structured format of the interview
provided both structure for analytical purposes, as well as the flexibility to ask follow up
questions for clarity that may be applied to understanding a specific organization’s role or
perspective.
The standard script included a heading, instructions, standard research questions,
and participant-specific and/or follow-up questions.

The interview participant’s

responses were recorded, whenever possible via digital tape recorder. However, if the
interview participant preferred, they were able to complete the interview through an email dialogue.

Although, differences in data collection method are generally not

preferred (unless analyzing the method), the value in the collection of responses from
various organizations outweighs the bias that may be introduced through the difference in
collection method. All recorded interviews were transcribed into an interview record.
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Additionally, the interviewer, in this case the author, took written notes to indicate a
record of points of interest or points requiring follow-up.
3.6 Data Analysis Procedures
Like many other aspects of qualitative case study research, there is no “right way”
to analyze data (Tesch, 1990; Creswell, 1994); rather, there is no one right way. There
are a number of accepted guidelines that can ease the emergence of themes, patterns, and
theories. Creswell (1994) suggests a spiral model, aptly appropriate considering the
subject matter, in which raw data is continually reviewed with a different focus each time
refining the data and making it usable. These categories and a brief description of each
are identified in Figure 3.01. Tesch (1990) describes a similar, more detailed process in
eight steps listed below.

1. Get a sense of the whole. Read through all of the
transcripts carefully. Perhaps jot down some ideas as they
come to mind.
2. Pick one document (one interview)—the most
interesting, the shortest, the one on the top of the pile. Go
through it asking yourself, What is this about? Do not think
about the “substance” of the information, but rather its
underlying meaning. Write thoughts in the margin.
3. When you have completed this task for several
informants, make a list of all topics. Cluster together
similar topics. Form these topics into columns that might
be arrayed as major topics, unique topics, and leftovers.
4. Now take this list and go back to your data. Abbreviate
the topics as codes and write the codes next to the
appropriate segments of the text. Try out this preliminary
organizing scheme to see whether new categories and codes
emerge.
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5. Find the most descriptive wording for your topics and
turn them into categories. Look for reducing your total list
of categories by grouping topics that relate to each other.
Perhaps draw lines between your categories to show
interrelationships.
6. Make a final decision on the abbreviation for each
category and alphabetize the codes.
7. Assemble the data material belonging to each category in
one place and perform a preliminary analysis.
8. If necessary, recode your existing data. (Tesch, 1990)

Figure 3.01 – Creswell’s Data Analysis Spiral (after Creswell, 1994)
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These processes reflect Dr. Eisenhardt’s (1989) position that case studies can be
used to build theories if they remain open-ended. Consequently, developing a more
structured analysis is difficult without knowing the results of such data collection. In this
case, data analysis occurs simultaneously with data collection, data interpretation, and
report writing (Creswell, 1994). Therefore, data analysis consists of recognizing themes
that may indicate how effective the integrated deployment of the CJCSI 3170 and the
NSSAP 03-01 has been for national space systems.
3.7 Verification Steps
Verification is often considered an indication of truly scientific research
(Creswell, 1994) but is difficult to formalize in qualitative research. Consider some of
the assumptions and desired results of a qualitative process. The research is usually
descriptive of a process that the researcher has limited access to; in other words, the
researcher can not examine every single case at every point in time with everyone
involved. The research is also inductive in that the researcher frequently uses it to build
hypotheses, theories, and models to be tested.
With this in mind, it is understandable that some researchers suggest using terms
such as “authenticity” and “trustworthiness”; however both Creswell (1994) and Miles
and Huberman (1994) suggest using terms of validity and reliability.

Miles and

Huberman have also compiled a number of reflective questions that are useful in
assessing validity and reliability. Some of Miles and Huberman’s questions are listed
below that will be used in this research.
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3.7.1 Internal Validity
Creswell and Merriam define internal validity as “the accuracy of the information
and whether it matches reality.” Internal validity will be achieved by providing a number
of the interview participants with the research results and asking them to comment on
their accuracy in addition to a review of Miles and Huberman’s questions.
3.7.2 External Validity
External validity or transferability or fittingness indicates how “generalizable” the
conclusions of a study may be (Miles and Huberman, 1994). There appears to be some
difference in opinion as far as whether it is good to have a large or a small amount of
generalizability. According to Merriam, “the intent of qualitative research is not to
generalize findings, but to form a unique interpretation of event.” Miles and Huberman
take a more balanced approach, commenting that some generalizability is good because
there is meaning from the research for more people. However, if the findings are too
general, they begin to lose their importance.
3.7.3 Reliability
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), “the underlying issue here is whether
the process of the study is consistent, reasonably stable over time and across researchers
and methods.” This research builds-in reliability by examining three different space
programs, using the same protocol. “In case study research, in which the investigator
explores multi-site cases, one can examine whether the same patterns or events or
thematic constructs are replicated in different settings” (Creswell, 1994).
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Table 3.01 – Miles and Huberman’s Validity and Reliability Questions (Miles &
Huberman, 1994)
Internal Validity /
Credibility / Authenticity

External Validity /
Transferability /
Fittingness
2. Does the account “ring
1. Are the characteristics of
true,” make sense, seem
the original sample of
convincing or plausible,
persons, settings, processes
enable a “vicarious
(etc.) fully described
presence” for the reader?
enough to permit adequate
comparisons with other
samples?
5. Are the presented data
3. Is the sampling
well linked to the categories theoretically diverse enough
of prior or emerging theory? to encourage broader
Do the measures reflect the applicability?
constructs in play?
8. Are areas of uncertainty
5. Do the findings include
identified? (There should
enough “thick description”
be some.)
for readers to assess the
potential transferability,
appropriateness for their
own settings?
10. Have rival explanations 6. Does a range of readers
been actively considered?
report the findings to be
What happened to them?
consistent with their own
experiences?
12. Were the conclusions
7. Are the findings
considered to be accurate by congruent with, connected
original informants? If not, to, or confirmatory of prior
is there a coherent
theory?
explanation for this?

Reliability / Dependability
/ Auditability
1. Are the research
questions clear, and are the
features of the study design
congruent with them?

2. Is the researcher’s role
and status within the site
explicitly described?

3. Do findings show
meaningful parallelism
across data sources
(informants, contexts,
times)?
4. Are basic paradigms and
analytic constructs clearly
specified?

5. Were data collected
across the full range of
appropriate settings, times,
respondents, and so on
suggested by the research
questions?
11. Does the report suggest 8. Were data quality checks
settings where the findings
made (e.g. for bias, deceit,
could fruitfully be tested
informant
further?
knowledgeability)?
12. Have the findings been
9. Do multiple observers’
replicated in other studies to accounts converge, in
assess their robustness? If
instances, settings, or times
not, could replication efforts when they might be
be mounted easily?
expected to?
10. Were any forms of peer
or colleague review in
place?
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3.8 Summary
In this chapter, the author addressed various aspects of a qualitative procedure,
specifically why it was selected for this research and the assumptions that must
accompany a qualitative procedure. The multiple case study was announced as the
research design type. The definition of a case study and described characteristics of such
a design type indicated the appropriateness of selection for answering the research
question: how effective the integrated deployment of the CJCSI 3170 and the NSSAP 0301 has been for national space systems. The researcher’s role was described within the
context of the researcher’s related experience before the research, and the researcher’s
role of selecting cases and participants. The data collection procedure and analysis
procedures were also described. Data collection consisted of horizontal and vertical
interviews from a number of organizations across multiple programs and with differing
approval authority. Data analysis was completed by drawing themes from multiple
reviews of the data. The research was verified with measures to address internal and
external reliability, in addition to reliability.
discussed in Chapters Four and Five.
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The results of this methodology are

IV. Results and Discussion
4.1 Introduction
In addition to reviewing relevant research, articles, commission reports, and
guiding documentation, interviews were conducted across a number of organizations
involved in the acquisition process. These organizations included system acquirers,
users, air and space requirement developers, architecture designers, space policy
directors, and experts from the Defense System Management Course, Defense
Acquisition University, and Air Force Institute of Technology. Due to the policies of the
Investigative Research Board, the specific comments can not be published if they can be
attributed to an individual. Since individuals, frequently used personal examples and
were guaranteed confidentiality, the results of analysis are captured through the answers
to the investigative questions.
Recommendations are included in the investigative questions and in the following
section.

Some investigative questions were answered through another question’s

response and do not have a separate answer.
4.2 Investigative Question
What are the goals of an EA strategy? The goal of an evolutionary acquisition
strategy is to reduce the amount of time it takes to get added appropriate capability to the
user and to reduce cost growth. This is done by employing the strategy described as
follows.
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What is an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? To the Department of Defense
space community, an evolutionary acquisition strategy describes the acquisition of a
number of blocks of similar items with increasing capability. The added capability is
planned two to three blocks earlier than the block that the capability will be incorporated
in. Reasons for added capability may be a changing threat or a change in available
technology.

This is especially important since DoD does not drive technological

development like it did 50 years ago (Brown, 2004).

Although, this is more visible

outside of space systems, the development of Spaceship One and plans in Virginia and
Florida for space tourism are examples of an outside and commercial driver.
While this appears to produce similar systems to those produced in the past (i.e.
blocks with increasing capability), there is a different emphasis in how technology is
planned. A 100% solution is no longer sought for in the first block, with additional
capability added in following blocks. Instead, the first block should be about an 80%
solution and must provide an improved capability over the current system according to
the definition in NSSAP 03-01, or else not approved until mature technology is available.
However, some interviewees stated that among the user community, there is a fear that an
initial block will be developed to lay the groundwork for the following block to “leap
frog” over the capability of the former system, but the initial block will actually take a
step back in capability. Or, that the initial block may be such a slight improvement that
the second block will not be procured because the value to cost ratio was so low. To the
first problem, this is by NSSAP 03-01 definition, not an evolutionary acquisition. To the
second problem, if the increment was achieved with the cost that was budgeted, then
there would be no change in perceived value between the time the system was approved
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and the first block was completed.

This is possible if fairly mature technology is

incorporated from the beginning, because cost estimates will be more accurate.

In

addition to incorporating mature technology to reduce cost, EA attempts to reduce cost by
reducing risk through the selection of the development process. This is discussed in a
later section.
Because an 80% solution means that there is at least 20% more coming, and even
more through technology improvements where applicable, there is an increased need to
make arrangements up front to allow for this capability to be added.

The space

community understands this well because space-based systems can not cost effectively be
upgraded once launched, at this time. Therefore, any incremental improvements to a
space system have traditionally been achieved through ground-based software and
hardware upgrades for terminals or by launching backward compatible satellites to
supplement an existing constellation.
None of the interviewees viewed an evolutionary acquisition strategy as a new
strategy for the development of space systems. In truth, as defined in NSSAP 03-01,
many of today’s space systems could have operated under an evolutionary strategy. But,
the results may have been different if full understanding of the goals of EA was achieved.
For example, interviewees were asked to comment on the current, and past where
applicable, acquisition strategies for GPS, SBIRS, and TSAT. Several interviewees
referred to the initial acquisition strategy for all three programs as the “Big Bang”—
meaning that the programs tried to give the user all the capability that was requested in
the initial block. Some program offices seemed to realize sooner than others that this
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could not be achieved within cost and schedule constraints and incorporated a more
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, strategy.
GPS was initiated before an EA strategy was the preferred strategy and used
block development to procure the first blocks and models of the satellite. At the time, the
strategy was not considered evolutionary, but additional capability was planned for
following blocks from program initiation. GPS is now considered to be an evolutionary
acquisition and the third block will employ spiral development.
SBIRS was also initiated before an EA strategy was the preferred strategy. The
traditional waterfall model was used to design the system and the system was acquired
through a process known as Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR). TSPR
was created to reduce lengthy and cumbersome government oversight and allow the
contractor more flexibility to use best commercial practices to develop a system as long
as the overall objectives were met.

When the SBIRS program first breached its

Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), a decision was made to switch oversight from the
contractor back to the government. Additional requirements were levied on the SBIRS
program office and the acquisition of SBIRS began to take a more evolutionary form in
development, but not in acquisition. Necessary acquisition and operational level tasks
were broken into “effectivities;” however, the completion of one effectivity did not add
an improved capability because the effectivity was only effective if the whole system was
operational. There are a number of differing opinions within SBIRS as to whether an
evolutionary acquisition strategy, as defined in NSSAP 03-01, was ever used.
The concept for TSAT was initiated slightly before EA became the preferred
strategy and one interviewee said that it would have been an incremental development
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process anyway.

TSAT’s use of an evolutionary acquisition strategy employing

incremental development was done “to show reduction of risk through early launch.”
The space community’s employment of an EA strategy has not achieved the
desired goals for at least two reasons. The 80% solution has not really been adopted as
an acceptable solution, probably because of some of the concerns described above. The
second reason is that the space community is still looking for a revolutionary
advancement. Transformation seems to be viewed more as a radical change than small
evolving changes to modernize. Even if employed correctly, an EA strategy has many
new ramifications given the transformed environment that space systems are operating in.
This will be discussed in following sections on capability-acquisitions.
How is an EA strategy implemented? The technological portion of an acquisition
strategy is implemented through a development process. For DoD space systems, the
practical difference between spiral or incremental development is somewhat gray, but all
of the interviewees differentiated the terms correctly by the degree to which the desired
end state of a system is known. However, the development process occurs within a
block, according to Figure 2.07, and the desired end state of the block that is being
developed should be known. Therefore the distinguishing characteristic of degree to
which the end state is known, does not really make sense when considering a block.
Similarly, if considering the system instead of the block, is the desired end state ever
known if the purpose of EA is to allow for changing threats or technology? This
differentiation between development processes should be removed and one process, such
as the spiral-mapped Vee model could be used to develop a block. The spiral-mapped
Vee model is the same model depicted on the Integrated Defense Acquisition,
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Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management Framework from 2004. This map is
located in the back cover of the thesis.
There is more to an acquisition strategy than the technical development aspect.
There are contractual, financial, testing, and logistical implications as well that really
have not been considered in NSSAP 03-01. When asked to comment on evolutionary
acquisition, one interviewee colorfully responded “What’s a spiral look like? A screw—
and that’s what it means for logistics.”
As shown in the above statement, it is not uncommon for the terms evolutionary
acquisitions and spiral development to be interchanged, however all of the academicbased (meaning AFIT, DAU, and DSMC) interviewees could distinguish between the
terms, while users and some program office interviewees had more difficulty. This may
be attributed to the fact that the terms evolutionary, spiral, and incremental are used
almost interchangeably (Larman, 2003) in commercial organizations and in particular,
software design and systems engineering communities.

These specifically describe

development processes, with the exception of software engineering which can produce
useful code after one spiral. Perhaps a worthy metaphor for clarification of what DoD’s
EA strategy means even for software intensive space systems is the term “evolutionary
deployment.” Figure 4.01 depicts evolutionary deployment and development.
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Figure 4.01 – Evolutionary Deployment v. Development (Gamache, 2006)
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What development processes are alternatives to evolutionary acquisitions?
Development processes are not alternatives to acquisition strategies.

As mentioned

above, they represent the technical portion of a system. An alternative to an EA strategy
would be one in which all desired capability was achieved in one block. This alternative
could even use spiral development and not be an evolutionary acquisition system.
Alternative development processes were described in Chapter Two. However, several
systems engineering experts recommended that the Vee be used because it is similar to
the traditional waterfall model if used once or similar to a spiral if repeated as more
information about the desired capability is available.
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What is a capability-based acquisition? There was a major difference in how the
term capability-based acquisition was defined between literature and interviewees.
Literature tended to define the term as requirements and acquisition processes focused on
meeting a desired capability through a number of means, including Family-of-Systems,
System-of-Systems, or a traditional platform.

This concept was supported by the

emphasis on interoperable systems for joint users, especially for information systems
including space systems.

Interviewees defined capability-based acquisitions as a

requirements process that was more relaxed in the extent to which requirements were
identified or defined, with the goal of giving the contractor more flexibility in how a
system is developed. These two ideas are almost mutually exclusive. The literature
definition is supported in policy, while the interviewees’ definition is in sharp contrast to
findings of several commissions investigating acquisition problems over the past twenty
years. Specifically, the interoperability that is necessary to achieve a joint netcentric
environment requires adherence to specific standards in several areas.
The literature definition of capability-based acquisitions has a significant impact
on an evolutionary acquisition strategy. Not only do program managers have to manage
a number of evolving blocks, making trade-offs between blocks to reduce risk or
incorporate new technology or address a different threat. Now they must make these
decisions considering the affects to other systems within a program’s FoS or SoS.
Disciplined systems engineering practices are more important than ever to make such
vertical (between blocks) and horizontal (between systems) trade-offs.

Figure 4.02

depicts horizontal and vertical trade-offs for a typical space system. Figure 4.03 depicts

63

the systems engineering complexity between two systems that must be interoperable to
provide a specified capability.

Figure 4.02 – Horizontal and Vertical Trade-offs for a Space System (Gamache, 2006)
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At this time, these trade-offs are made largely by both formal and informal
committees, although the committee membership differed amongst interviewee
responses. Program offices and SMC at large, have chief system engineers that monitor
these trade-offs and provide recommendations, but an overarching capability has no chief
systems engineer or director responsible for making such decisions across platforms and
services. In addition to systems engineers trained at the system, program, and capability
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levels, DoD acquisitions could benefit from switching service-specific Program
Executive Officers (PEO) to joint Capability Acquisition Executives (CAE). This would
reduce redundancy, excessive levels of oversight and burden on the J-8, and avoid tradeoff decisions being made by what one interviewee described as a room full of “500-lb
gorillas.”

Figure 4.03 – Horizontal and Vertical Trade-offs for Interoperable Space Systems
(Gamache, 2006)
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What are the goals of capability-based acquisitions? The main goal of capabilitybased acquisitions is to develop acquisition solutions that are responsive to the way DoD
conducts operations. Specifically, reductions in funding and changes in threats require
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more agile and efficient warfighting, which can be accomplished by eliminating unneeded redundancy of efforts and people and supplementing with easier information
exchange. Capability-based acquisitions accomplishes this by encouraging solutions to
be joint, interoperable, and netcentric and emphasizing the development of a capability
over the platform.
How are capability-based acquisitions implemented? JCIDS’ guidance primarily
addresses JCIDS oversight, review, and documentation of the decision support system.
There is little to no appropriate implementation guidance for the program level. Aside
from there not being DoD-directed acquisition policy, Air Force Instruction 63-1
“Capability-Based Acquisition System” (2003) does not give any guidance on
implementation, let alone define the term. “Joint” is used only twice in the definition for
warfighter and in referencing a document. AFI 63-1 also specifically states that it does
not apply to space systems.
How does the acquisition workforce view the implementation of JCIDS and
NSSAP documentation? None of the interviewees experienced or expected to experience
a reduction in capability development time or cost overruns. Several reasons were cited
by the interviewees including:
•
•
•
•

Too much technology development after committing to a solution
Funding profile not matching identified space system profile of 80% in
development and production and 20% in operations and maintenance
Unstable funding or not enough reserve (25%) for Program Manager flexibility
No day-to-day operations change in JCIDS from RGS, other than joint focus
which does not trickle down through Service
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4.3 Recommendations
The results and discussion of the literature review, interviews, and investigative
questions led to recommendations in the categories of:
•
•
•
•

Acquisition Expertise
Requirements Control
Capable Technology and Industrial Base
Realistic Budgeting

Some recommendations are applicable to system acquisition outside of the space
community. Although many of these recommendations were included in the discussion
section, they are consolidated in the subsequent sections.
4.3.1 Acquisition Expertise
Service PEOs need to be converted into Joint Capability Acquisition Executives
(CAEs), responsible for acquiring a capability through the management of a portfolio of
programs.

Joint CAEs would be responsible for ensuring executable APBs for

supporting programs and PMs must have adequate pre-acquisition funding to assemble
people, tools and data to establish executable APBs with the CAE. Expertise could be
cultivated by requiring a rotational assignment in industry and systems engineering
before becoming a PM. Level three space professional certification would be a requisite
for all PM and CAE positions for space systems.
4.3.2 Requirements Control
Controlling requirements is necessary for implementing an evolutionary
acquisition strategy, but even more critical with the acquisition of capabilities through
SoSs and FoSs. The Association for Operations Management recommends limiting key
management requirements to somewhere between three and seven. With the help of the
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users, CAEs must establish or accept no more than five key performance parameters
(KPPs) per system supporting the overall capability, for example.

This will allow

program managers (PM) to have more degrees of freedom in how their portion of
capability is provided. Similarly, with the help of the users, PMs should further limit the
number of KPPs per block. It is true that changes in threats, technology, or available
knowledge may require an additional validated KPP, however, limiting KPPs per system
or increment will force system development to move forward and use following
increments as they were meant to be used to shorten cycle time and account for these
changes.
Requirements control can also be accomplished at the capability-level. As the
expert on currently available capability, CAEs would be responsible for completing
Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) instead of Service-specific requirements organizations
working with a System Program Office. To accomplish this, CAEs with system-ofsystems engineering (SoSE) expertise would need to invest in accredited SoSE tools and
SoS engineers with JCIDS and NSSAP Joint Program Office experience. Finally, the
CAE should establish SoS measures of effectiveness (MOEs). After all, “it is important
to understand that ‘metrics matter.’ We must be able to define success and measure it. On
the battlefield, we can easily measure the performance of the capabilities provided
through the Global Positioning System or Military Satellite Communication. We need to
do the same as we develop the next generation space capabilities. We must know where,
when and how we are succeeding…and failing” (Lord, 2006).
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4.3.3 Capable Technology & Industrial Base
The commercial market for space has been rather unpredictable.

With the

consolidation of defense space contractors, the space system community needs a better
mechanism to “pull” DoD science and technology investments and to provide guidance to
the industrial base for independent research and development (IRAD) and capital
investment, ensuring that technology matures at a steady or accelerated rate.
4.3.4 Realistic Budgeting and Funding
Budget instability was a major concern among interviewees.

Two

recommendations can be made based on two main causes of inaccurate budgets being not
enough information or designing to not enough money.
The space system community needs a methodology for creating more accurate
cost estimates of Horizontal Integration (HI), immature technologies, and space industrial
base restructuring costs. Additionally, the Young Panel recommendation of an 80/20
ratio of funds with a 25% margin and not using contractor estimates in competitive
situations would increase the accuracy of initial cost estimates. Requiring that SPO cost
estimates and Independent Cost Estimates reconcile at KDPs would provide insight into
problem areas and reduce the frequency and severity of unforeseen overrun.
Although not adequately examined due to the scope of the research, one
recommendation could be made for joint systems, such as space systems and information
systems, being funded out of separate joint funding, as opposed to service-specific
funding.
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4.4 Summary
Chapter Four summarized the results of the literature review and interviews
analysis with respect to the investigative questions. Due to restrictions placed by the
Human Research Board the names, organizations, and specific quotations could not be
included in the published thesis. The synthesized data identified four areas of
recommendations that would lead to the improvement of the interaction between the
JCIDS and NSSAP.
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V. Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
The results and recommendations presented in Chapter Four lay the framework
for a theory to be presented. DoD’s challenge is to create an environment that enables
program managers’ mission success by ensuring that the acquisition program baselines
for all National Security Space systems are executable and stable. That environment lies
within the overlap of the JCIDS, NSSAP, and PPBE Process.
5.2 Theory Building
Once in that environment, a program manager will be faced with many decisions
that must be made considering six factors, or trade space areas. Those areas for trade
space are: requirements, cost, schedule, risk, system concept, and the available
technology and industrial base. Figure 5.01 illustrates this concept with the margin for
trade in the middle.
Previous models have presented a similar decision making box, typically
considering cost, schedule, and performance (or requirements). However, research shows
that many more factors play a role in determining mission success for space systems.
The employment of an evolutionary strategy in the NSSAP attempts to make use of the
most current, mature technologies and mitigate risk, in addition to lowering cost through
risk reduction.

“Pursuit of leap-ahead capabilities will need to accommodate risk

reduction and technology maturation, most likely through spiral development and
evolutionary progress.” (Neuman, 2006)

Similarly, the change to capability-based

acquisitions in the JCIDS, not only affects requirement generation, but also opens the
71

door for employing system-of-systems (SoSs) to meet a capability deficiency, requiring
attention be paid to system concept.

Figure 5.01 – The Program Manager’s Decision Making Box (Gamache, 2006)

Technology &
Industrial Base

Requirements

Schedule

Risk

MARGIN

Cost
System Concept

“Like any policies, how you deal with them is key” (Coyle, 2003) and the same is
true for the CJCS series and NSSAP 03-01. While the policies are fairly sound, with a
number of good ideas like NSSAP 03-01’s independent program assessment (IPA), the
tools, mechanisms, and people are not in place to implement the policies with their
desired intent.
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The recommendations presented in Chapter Four state some of the tools and how
to acquire the people needed to implement such policies, enabling better interaction
between JCIDS and NSSAP.
5.3 Future Research
Additional research can be conducted in a number of areas. Because JCIDS
applies to all services and a number of the recommendations would affect all services,
similar research should be accomplished within the sister services before attempting to
correct any problems with the JCIDS. The concept of joint Capability Acquisition
Executives managing architectures of SoSs and FoSs must be further developed.
As mentioned in Chapter One, a limitation of the research was that it did not
address the PPBE Process. Budget stability was a major theme in the interviews and to a
lesser extent in the literature; however, it was not examined in this research to keep the
scope manageable. The PPBE Process should also be reviewed for space systems.
In the author’s opinion, one of the most important areas of future research is in
DoD’s implementation practices.

Specifically, one could research whether tools,

mechanisms, and skilled people were in place before or after a policy was released.
DoD’s philosophy on the role of policies could also be defined.
Finally, the recommendations of this thesis should be tested before implemented.
While literature and interview data support the recommendations, a more thorough
investigation as to the implications of such recommendations should be made before
implementation.
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Appendix A
Interview Invitation Letter
Dear (Interview Participant’s Name),
I am a graduate student at the Air Force Institute of Technology, studying
Research and Development Management and Space Systems. My master’s thesis
research is examining the interaction between the Joint Capability Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). As your
schedule permits, I would like to set up an appointment to interview you about your
experiences on the subject.
My research includes interviews with people throughout the acquisition process
for developing the nation’s space systems, from the individuals operating the resultant
system to those individuals who identified the existing deficiency requiring such a system
to be developed. This research will describe the degree of interaction between the JCIDS
and the DAS, identify major themes, and propose recommendations for areas of
improvement as these areas are discovered.
The interview will follow, but is not limited to, a standard set of questions that are
included. This semi-structured approach will allow for the analysis of responses to same
questions across all interviews, as well as provide for any additional information that may
be helpful to understanding an organization’s perspective or provide clarity. Information
collected during the interview will remain confidential throughout the entire process,
including the resulting thesis and related articles. The interview questions have been
approved through the Air Force Institute of Technology’s process for Human Subject
Research Approval.
Please respond, indicating whether you are or are not willing to participate in such
an interview. If willing, also indicate a time and date convenient to you and falling on or
before 31 Jan 2006 for the interview to occur. With your permission, the interview will
be recorded. The interview may also be administered through an e-mail dialogue if you
prefer.
Thank you in advance for your time, consideration, and willingness to participate
in my thesis research. If you have any questions, I can be reached by phone at 937-xxxxxxx and by e-mail at joyce.gamache@afit.edu.

Sincerely,
Joyce Gamache
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Appendix B
Survey Questions
Name and Rank:
Duty Title and Description:
Relevant Coursework (DSMC, DAU) or Seminars:
Interview Time and Method:
Instructions
You are reminded that the personal information and responses collected today
will remain completely confidential. They are collected to develop themes and measure
the effectiveness of the implementation of the CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP 03-01 on the Joint
Capability Integrated Development System (JCIDS) and the Defense Acquisition System
(DAS).
With your permission, this interview will be recorded by digital voice recorder.
You will be asked the eight standard questions that were e-mailed to you earlier and may
be asked additional participant-specific, follow-up questions. Please answer the seven
questions with respect to GPS, SBIRS, TSAT, and any other relevant space program that
you have had experience with. Thank you for participating in this research.
Standard Questions
1. Please describe your organization’s role in the JCIDS & DAS processes.
2. The NSSAP 03-01 defines evolutionary acquisitions, spiral development and
incremental development as follows.
EA is defined as an acquisition approach that delivers capability in
increments, recognizing up front the need for future capability
improvements. This approach requires collaboration among the user,
tester, and developer. The two main processes to perform EA are:
a) Spiral Development. In this process, a desired capability is
identified, but the end-state requirements are not known at program
initiation. Those requirements are refined through demonstration and risk
management, there is continuous user feedback, and each increment
provides the user the best possible capability. The requirements for future
increments depend on feedback from users and technology maturation.
b) Incremental Development. In this process, a desired capability is
identified, an end-state requirement is known, and that requirement is met
over time by development of several increments, each dependent on
available mature technology.
Do the following programs employ an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? If so, does
the program use incremental or spiral development and why was this method selected
over the alternative?
GPS –
75

SBIRS –
TSAT –
Other –
3. Who is responsible, and what processes or tools do they use, for making trade-offs
between the capabilities provided by the system-of-systems (SoS) or family-of-systems
(FoS) at the mission level, and then deciding the space system acquisition spirals or
increments? What sort of documentation is required (if any) to reflect this?
GPS –
SBIRS –
TSAT –
Other –
4. Has, or will, the NSSAP 03-01 implementation of EA on space programs dramatically
reduced capability timelines and space program overruns? Why or why not?
GPS –
SBIRS –
TSAT –
Other –
5. Has, or will, the CJCSI 3170 implementation of the JCIDS process dramatically
reduced capability timelines and space program overruns? Why or why not?
GPS –
SBIRS –
TSAT –
Other –
6. Prior to the implementation of EA through DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2 for the
DAS and NSSAP 03-01 for space systems, what kind of acquisition process would have
been undertaken?
GPS –
SBIRS –
TSAT –
Other –
7. Please review the diagrams of CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP 03-01 products and events as a
function of major program phase. Please identify what has worked well and why.
GPS –
SBIRS –
TSAT –
Other –
8. Please review the diagrams of CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP 03-01 products and events as a
function of major program phase. Please identify what has not worked well and why.
GPS –
SBIRS –
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TSAT –
Other –
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Figure 3.1 – CJCSI 3170 Products and Events as a Function of Major Phase (CJCSI
3170, 2005)
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Figure 3.2 – NSSAP 03-01 Products and Events as a Function of Major Program Phase,
Small Quantity System Model (NSSAP 03-01, 2004)

Figure 3.3 – NSSAP 03-01 Products and Events as a Function of Major Program Phase,
Large Quantity System Model (NSSAP 03-01, 2004)
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